Summary
Militants attacked a Sri Lankan cricket team March 3 in Lahore, Pakistan. From all indications, the perpetrators failed to inflict significant physical harm on the players, but the fact that they were able to plan and implement the attack -- however ineffectively -- highlights the importance of countersurveillance in preventing such attacks in the first place.

Analysis
A Sri Lankan cricket team was attacked by gunmen in Lahore, Pakistan, the morning of March 3 on its way to the third day of a match with a Pakistani team. As the motorcade of police, cricket players and umpires entered a roundabout a quarter of a mile from the stadium, two cars entered the roundabout and an occupant fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at the bus carrying the players. The RPG missed the target and hit a storefront, while a hand grenade thrown under the bus rolled beyond it and exploded without damaging the vehicle.

After the initial grenade attack, three other gunmen took up positions in the center of the roundabout and began firing at the police van escorting the cricket players before turning their attention to the bus itself. The bus driver was able to evade the gunmen and safely deposit the team at nearby Gaddafi Stadium, where the match was to be held. From there, the team was evacuated by helicopter. Six members of the team reportedly suffered minor injuries.

The target of the attack obviously was the Sri Lankan cricket team. The incident took place at approximately 8:30 a.m. local time, before most stores in the area had opened. It was not carried out at the actual cricket match, where more civilians would have been put in harm’s way and where beefed-up security would most likely have prevented the attackers from gaining entrance. By going after the team while it was in transit to the stadium, the attackers were able to hit the target when it was most vulnerable and predictable.

The objective of the attack appears to have been to disable the bus with an RPG and hand grenades or, if those failed, gunfire so that the team would be caught in the open with no clear exit to safety. By disabling the lead police vehicle first, the gunmen were employing the standard tactic of blocking and bunching up the following vehicles to make them easier targets. One of the team members said during a press conference that gunmen were aiming for the tires of the bus in an attempt to stop it. There were also several bullet holes in the front windshield of the bus, indicating that gunmen may have been targeting the driver, but he was not injured and was able to get the bus out of the attack zone (“off the X”), an action that saved the team members’ lives as well as his own. From the improvised explosive devices, grenades and extra ammunition found in backpacks abandoned nearby, it appears that the attackers had bigger plans in mind.

Clearly, the attack was reasonably well-planned, if not so well-executed. The attackers appear to have known where the bus would be and the approximate time it would be there. Considering it was the third day of the cricket match, this is not surprising. Motorcades following daily routines are easy targets; attackers need only to establish their positions and wait for the convoy to show up at about the same time it showed up on previous days. While there are indications that police had received warning of an attack on the team and may have altered the route on the day of the attack, the roundabout leading from Gulberg Main Boulevard to Liberty Square appears to be a major choke point just a few hundred yards from Gaddafi Stadium. The bus was attacked from the front and both sides, showing that gunmen had planned an ambush and deployed their forces in a manner that gave them several angles of attack.

After it was clear that the assault on the cricket team had failed, the gunmen fired on other vehicles in the convoy, including the vehicle carrying the umpires, most of whom were foreigners. The gunmen were able to disable the umpires’ vehicle, but the gunmen did not stay around to finish them off, perhaps because their main target, the bus carrying the cricket team, had evaded the ambush.

Several members of the Sri Lankan team were injured, including an assistant coach from Australia, but no members were seriously injured. However, five police officers and one bystander were killed. The attackers fled on foot and in a stolen car. Police have reported that they have detained four of the culprits.

The fact that the attackers were able to position themselves and initiate a well-coordinated ambush from several directions shows that they were prepared and had received at least a modicum of tactical training. (A moderate skill level suggests that a more organized group was behind this attack.) While it did not result in maximum damage, the violence was sufficient to show the country — and the world — that Pakistani security forces could not protect a high-profile foreign delegation. This comes as no real surprise, as they also were unable to protect former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

In order to plan such an attack, those responsible had to have conducted preoperational surveillance of the cricket team’s security detail and the routes used to take the team to the stadium. Operatives conducting such surveillance are vulnerable to detection if security forces are looking for them. While the bus driver (whom we believe was likely a trained security driver) saved the day by getting the players off the X, the attack could have been prevented had the preoperational surveillance been detected.